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COMMENTS
Artificial Insemination - A Model Statute
T HE INCREASING INCIDENCE OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATIONS in the
fifties and sixties resulted in a profusion of commentary devoted
to the significance of the procedure.1 Characteristic of the motivations
of many writers were the moral, psychological, and social implications
of the technique. In contrast, the creative legal response was limited.
Paralleling the stagnation of judicial and legislative action in most
states, the number of commentators addressing the issue in recent
years has been minimal. 2 This comment hopes to focus the attention
of legislators on the need to clarify the morass surrounding artificial
insemination.
While statistical data is scant and the available estimates often
conflict, one estimate places the annual number of births in the United
States resulting from the process at twenty thousand,3 while others
are far less conservative.4 The rapid scientific advancement in the
field as evidenced by these statistics suggests that the number of
artificial inseminations performed in the future will sharply increase,
1 Artificial insemination is usually performed in three situations:
( 1) When the husband is unable to procreate because of impotency or some other physical
incapacity other than sterility, artificial insemination homologous [hereinafter referred to
as A.I.H.] is employed, by which the husband's semen is used. Note, Artificial Insemination,
30 BROOKLYN L. REV. 302, 303 (1964). No significant legal questions are presented by
this procedure, since the husband's semen is used and therefore the child is unquestionably
his.
(2) Artificial insemination heterologous [hereinafter referred to as A.I.D.; in certain contexts
it will refer to artificial insemination in general] entails the added involvement of a third-
party donor. Id. It is this procedure that presents most of the legal problems which will be
discussed.
(3) A hybrid procedure which involves the use of a mixture of the husband's semen with
that of a third-party donor and has been termed "confused" artificial insemination [herein-
after referred to as C.A.I.], Tallin, Artificial Insemination, 34 CAN. B. REV. 1, 7-8 (1956),
or combined artificial insemination. Note, Social and Legal Aspects of Human Artificial
Insemination, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 859 n. 4, citing Guttmacher, The Role of Artificial Insem-
ination in the Treatment of Sterility, 15 OBSTET. AND GYNECOL. SURVEY 767, 773 (1960).
The labyrinth created by this procedure is neither more certain nor less of a problem and
thus should be considered equally along with the analysis of A.I.D. legal problems. See also
O'Rahilly, Artificial Insemination: Medical Aspects, 34 U. DET. L.J. 383 (1957); Sym-
posium on Artificial Insemination, 7 SYRAcuSE L. REV. 96, 97 (1955) (common indica-
tions for use of donor semen).
2 For historical and bibliographic material see CIBA FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM, LAW AND
ETHICS OF A.I.D. AND EMBRYO TRANSFER 17 (New Series 1973); R. FRANCOEUR,
UTOPIAN MOTHERHOOD (1973) [hereinafter cited as FRANCOEUR]; Note, Social and
Legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination, supra note 1 at 860-62.
3 FRANCOEUR, supra note 2, at 19.
4 Samuel G. Kling (author of several books on medicolegal problems) says artificial insem-
ination births number closer to ten thousand per year in New York City alone. With the
success rate of impregnation as low as twenty per cent, the total number of inseminations
performed in the United States each year could easily be in excess of one hundred thousand.
Moreover, the number of people affected is almost certainly higher than the least conserva-
tive estimate, since those who take advantage of the procedure are not apt to publicize the
fact for fear of societal disapproval and because of some of the legal consequences. Id.
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making legislative action imperative.' Artificial insemination poses
a variety of legal issues concerning legitimacy,6 divorce, support, and
adultery, which the courts and legislatures have failed to address
adequately. Consequently, following a critical examination of the
cases and some existing statutes, a model statute will be proposed.
The Judicial Morass
The reasons for the dearth of case law in this area are speculative
at best and differences of opinion are certain to exist. Opponents of
A.I.D. often point to this very fact when arguing against the need for
legislation. However, it does not follow a fortiori that the number of
people affected is minimal.' The few cases that are reported and meet
the problem squarely evidence the importance of the issue to those
involved. Moreover, it is apparent from an examination of these cases
that the decisions and their underlying rationale lack uniformity and
require statutory clarification.
Commonwealth Decisions
Several noteworthy Commonwealth cases have treated the artificial
insemination issue, the earliest being Orford v. Orford.8 In Orford
plaintiff and defendant had never consummated their marriage
because of painful intercourse. Nevertheless, the wife gave birth to
a child. In an action for alimony, the husband defended by alleging
that his wife had committed adultery, and the wife responded that
the birth resulted from A.I.D. The court indicated that the plaintiff's
action could have been successful only if it were first proven that
A.I.D. had in fact been performed, and if it were further found
that as a matter of law this procedure is not adulterous, notwithstand-
ing the fact that it was performed without the husband's consent.
The court refused to accept the wife's account of the A.I.D. as credible,
ruling that she had committed adultery in the ordinary way and
sThe increase in the number of frozen sperm banks in the United States as a result of
improved storage techniques will undoubtedly be followed by a rise in the artificial insem-
ination rate. Id. at 283-84. Additionally, the change in societal attitudes with a trend toward
liberalization is an important factor. For sociological, psychological, and religious attitudes
see Bohn, Artificial Insemination, 34 U. DET. L.J. 397 (1957); Diennes, Artificial Donor
Insemination: Perspectives on Legal and Social Change, 54 IowA L. REv. 253 (1968);
Kelly, Artificial Insemination; Theological and Natural Law Aspects, 33 U. DET. L.J. 135
(1955); Pommerenke, Artificial Insemination: Genetic and Legal Implications, 9 OBSTET.
AND GYNECOL. SURVEY, 189 (1957); Symposium, Morals, Medicine and the aw, 31
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1157 (1956); Note, Social and Legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insem-
ination, 1965 WIs. L. REV. 859.
6 Legitimacy is possibly the most important issue since the child is burdened with certain
legal disabilities, such as limitations on property and inheritance rights, directly flowing
from the status of illegitimacy. The removal of this characterization necessarilly eliminates
the consequent legal problems. For a survey of the legal consequences of illegitimacy see
H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 177-180 (1968);
H. KRANSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971).
7 See notes 3, 4, 5 supra.
8 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
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hence was not entitled to alimony payments. While this finding would
have been sufficient on the merits, the court chose to confront the
plaintiff's legal argument that A.I.D. would not constitute adultery,
and thus, by way of dictum, the court rejected the contention that
actual sexual intercourse must be involved. The court also disagreed
with the categorization of moral turpitude as the essential element
of adultery. Rather it viewed adultery as
the voluntary surrender to another person of the reproductive
powers or faculties of the guilty person; and any submission
of those powers to the service or enjoyment of any person
other than the husband or the wife comes within the definition
of "adultery."
The court extended this logic to the point of suggesting that "such
an act performed upon a women against her will might constitute
rape."10
This blanket statement characterizing A.I.D. as adulterous is
unwarranted considering the definition of adultery and the rationale
behind making the offense grounds for divorce." An adulterous situa-
tion presupposes direct physical contact between two individuals, a
requisite not easily met in the context of an A.I.D. procedure. One
commentator considered the court's rationale absurd since the mo-
tivation for adulterous conduct is most often sexual gratification.1 2
Pregnancy, far from being a desired result, is carefully avoided
through contraception. Hence, if surrendering one's reproductive
powers is the essence of adultery, 3 the "normal" adulterous situation
is no longer objectionable. On the other hand, if pleasure and physical
contact are the bases for adultery, how can the court find adultery
in a factual setting where the dominant motive is conception and the
means involves neither physical contact nor sexual gratification ?14
'Id. at 258 (emphasis added). But see Maclennan v. Maclennan, [19581 Sess. Cas. 105
(Scot.), discussed in Note, A Legislative Approach to Artificial Insemination, 53 CORNELL
L. REv. 497, 501 (1968); Hoch v. Hoch, No. 44-C-9307 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill.
1945) discussed in Note, Social and Legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination, 1965
WIS. L. REV. 859, 875.
10 Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251, 258 (1921).
n "Voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with a person other than the offender's
husband or wife." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 71 (4th ed. 1951). See generally 2A
WORDS AND PHRASES, "Adultery" 96 (1955). The term sexual intercourse seems to be
consistently present in the definitions. It is important to note also that the cases which
define sexual intercourse uniformly include penetration as requisite. See generally 39
WORDS AND PHRASES, "Sexual Intercourse" 107 (1955) and the cases cited therein.
2 Biskind, Legitimacy of Children Born by Artificial Insemination, 5 J. FAM. LAW 39, 46
(1965).
13This also raises the question of whether others (eg., physician or donor) would likewise
be guilty of adultery. Id. at 47.
U4See Tallin, Artificial Insemination, 34 CAN. B. REv. 1, 21 (1956) (suggesting tests for
adultery).
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A later English decision further illustrates the absence of sound
reasoning on the part of the judiciary. As in Orford, the marriage
in L. v. L.15 was never consummated, with failure attributed to the
husband's psychological problems. A.I.H. 16 had been performed, re-
sulting in the birth of a child. The wife subsequently sought to annul
the marriage on the grounds that it had not been consummated. The
petition was granted which in effect made the child, born of a void
marriage, illegitimate. The argument against permitting the decree
was estoppel and approbation, in that the plaintiff herself had author-
ized the procedure and thus public policy should not have permitted
her to claim at such a late date that she wished the marriage annulled.
The wife testified that she had acquiesced to the procedure in an
attempt to cure her husband's psychological problems. In this light
the court rejected the husband's argument, reasoning that his wife's
actions could not be construed as approbation of what remained an
abnormal marriage.1 7 Almost as an afterthought the court turned its
attention to the unfortunate child.
That the child should be made illegitimate is most regrettable,
but the stigmas of birth are of less effect than they were, and
sons are not now judged by the errors of their parents.8
Such an observation is indicative of the insensitivity of the courts
in dealing with the plight of such children. Though paying lip service
to the injustice of judging children by the acts of their parents, that
is precisely what the court has done.
American Decisions
The American judicial attitude toward A.I.D. has been diverse
and often confusing. Initiating this confusion was the case of Strnad
v. Strnad,9 in which the visitation rights of a husband who had con-
sented to A.I.D. were at issue. The court granted visiting privileges
even though the child was not of the husband's blood. To justify their
decision, the court found that in effect the child had been potentially
adopted or semi-adopted, and therefore, the husband was entitled to
the same rights and privileges that he would have if the child had
been formally adopted.20 This decision is of questionable value in
clarifying the A.I.D. problem. There is no legal support in the case
itself and the term "semi-adopted" has not been found in any other
1s [1949] 1 All E. R. 141 (P. 1948).
16 See note 1 supra.
17 Accord, Slater v. Slater, [1953) 1 All E. R. 246 (C.A. 1952).
18 [1949] 1 All E. R. at 145. Fortunately this problem is remedied by statute in most
American states. See also Wadlington, Artificial Insemination: The Dangers of a Poorly
Kept Secret, 64 N.W. U. L. REV. 777, 787 n.41 (1970).
19 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
201d. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
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reported case. Instead of clearly defining the rights of the husband
as equivalent to those of a natural parent, the court adopted a spurious
fiction in an attempt to bring its rationale within existing legal doctrine
surrounding adoption. As a result, an opportunity to formulate dis-
tinct guidelines was bypassed.2
1
In Doornbos v. Doornbos,2 2 a declaratory judgment in an action for
divorce, the court held that the minor child conceived by A.I.D. was
illegitimate, that A.I.D. constituted adultery, and that the mother's
husband has no interest in the child.3 A month prior to the Doornbos
decision, another unreported case had been decided somewhat differ-
ently.2 4 There the court had avoided confronting the issue of legitimacy
by employing a strong presumption in its favor.25 In Doornbos, how-
ever, use of this presumption was precluded by the admission that
A.I.D. had been performed.
Finally, fifteen years after the Strnad case, a New York court met
the question of A.I.D. legitimacy head on in Gursky v. Gursky.26 The
case involved a husband's action for annulment and separation which
was dismissed for insufficient proof. However, the wife's counter-
claim, initially for separation and upon amendment for annulment,
was granted. She contended that the marriage had never been con-
summated. The evidence established that a child had been born to
21 Ten years after Strnad the A.I.D. question was again before the New York courts in
People ex rel. Abajian v. Dennett, 15 Misc. 2d 260, 263-64, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178, 182-83
(Sup. Ct. 1958). A husband petitioned to enforce a Nevada divorce decree that incorpor-
ated a New York separation agreement, in which he had been granted certain visitation
rights. For the first time the mother claimed the children were not his but were conceived
by A.I.D. and thus he had no rights concerning the children. The facts made it easy for
the court to disregard this questionable claim by stating that the Nevada decree was
entitled to full faith and credit and comity under the Constitution. The court implied that
if it were decided that tht A.I.D. claim was true, the children might well be deemed
illegitimate. In avoiding that result the court said:
[W]hatever now motivates respondent to assert the claim of artificial insem-
ination, so as to extinguish petitioner's privileges of custody and visitation,
most assuredly does not inure to the benefit of the children. For to stigmatize
them as children of an unkown father . . . is no more, in my view, than an
attempt to make these innocents out as children of bastardy. And where a parent
attempts such means, the law will still the lips of such a parent. This I believe
will be done even where artificial insemination is lawful, for, on the last turn,
it is the children who, when so revealed, must go through life in obfuscation.
Five years later the Strnad rationale was rejected by name. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d
1083, 1087-88, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 410-11 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
22 No. 54 S. 14931, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill., Dec. 13, 1954),
appeal dismissed, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956). Discussed in 43 GEo.
L.J. 517 (1955). Cf. Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
2 Contra, Hoch v. Hoch, No. 44-C-9307 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. 1945).
24 Ohlsen v. Ohlsen, (Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill. Nov., 1954), discussed in Rice, A.I.D.-An
Heir of Controversy, 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 510, 521 (1959); Comment, 32 WASH. L.
REV. 280, 281 (1957).
2SComment, 32 WASH. L. REV. 280, 281 (1957). Ohio's presumption of legitimacy is
strong, but is rebuttable with sufficient evidence. 21 OHIO JUR. 2d Evidence §103 (1956).
See also Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 572 (1957).
2639 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963), discussed in 30 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 126 (1963).
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her as a result of A.I.D., performed with her husband's written con-
sent. In addressing the legitimacy issue, the court chose to rely upon
the common law concept that "a child who is begotten through a
father who is not the mother's husband is deemed to be illegitimate."2
The court rejected Strnad, suggesting that adoption in New York is
accomplished according to statute, and if not undertaken in that
manner cannot be recognized. As such, the semi-adopted rationale of
the Strnad court fails and the child must be deemed illegitimate.2 8
Despite its decision to brand the child as illegitimate, the court applied
alternatively the doctrines of implied contract and equitable estoppel
to compel support of the child by the husband.29
The Gursky court's basic failure lies in its inability to modify com-
mon law concepts so as to render them compatible with a situation
engendered by modern technology. Moreover, it seems inequitable to
place the entire burden upon the husband. If a husband who consents
to the A.I.D. can be estopped to deny his obligations of support, why
then should the wife and mother be permitted to have the marriage
annulled? Sound public policy would dictate that in order to preserve
the family unit and give the child the benefit of two parents, a mother
who has consented to A.I.D. should be precluded from later asserting
the husband's impotency as grounds for annulment."0
The trend toward liberalization of A.I.D. case law began with
People v. Sorensen.31 In contrast to the aforementioned cases, this
decision came in response to the application of a criminal statute
Id. at 1085, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
2 Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390, 391 (Sup. Ct. 1948); see text
accompanying note 20 supra.
2Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 1088-89, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411-12 (Sup. Ct. 1963),
accord, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 41 Misc. 2d 886, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
30See In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1973)
(criticizing this case). The rationale for barring actions for annulment in such instances
is based upon the cases which allow defenses of laches or ratification. Some courts have
held that continued cohabitation for an unreasonable time, coupled with knowledge of
the alleged infirmity, will bar an action to annul. Donati v. Church, 13 N.J. Super. 454,
80 A.2d 633 (App. Div. 1951), citing G. v. M., 10 App. Cas. 171 (H.L. 1885); Godfrey
v. Shatwell, 38 N.J. Super. 501, 119 A.2d 479 (Ch. 1955); Kirschbaum v. Kirschbaum, 92
N.J. Eq. 7, 111 A. 697 (Ch. 1920); Jwaideh v. Jwaideh, 140 A.2d 303 (D.C. Mun.
Cr. 1958). It would seem that the additional fact of the artificial insemination procedure
should give rise to an even stronger inference of ratification. It is granted that an excep-
tion to this general rule of ratification is recognized in circumstances where an attempt is
made to alleviate the infirmity with reasonble expectations of success. In that event, a
court may find that a delay in initiating an annulment proceeding is justified. Singer v.
Singer, 9 N.J. Super. 397, 74 A.2d 622 (Ch. 1950). However, the performance of an
A.I.D. cannot in anyway be construed as an attempt to correct impotency or like disorders.
On the contrary, the mutual consent to an A.I.D. implies that the parties have decided
to continue the marriage and have children in spite of the problem. In these circumstances,
a subsequent petition for annulment should be barred on the basis of approbation of the
marriage.
31 63 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
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making it a misdemeanor to wilfully neglect to provide support for
one's minor child.3 2 The Supreme Court of California affirmed the
conviction of the defendant for refusing to support the child born
to his wife by means of A.I.D.
Seven years after the marriage the defendant husband had dis-
covered that he was sterile and initially had refused to consent to
either adoption or A.I.D. Eight years later, however, the couple
executed a written agreement permitting a physician to perform the
insemination. A child was born and the birth certificate listed the
defendant as the father, although the information had been provided
by the mother. For four years all went smoothly, during which time
the defendant represented to others that he was the father of the
child. A separation and subsequent divorce followed, the decree stating
that jurisdiction would be retained by the court in regard to any
support obligation.
Under the statute 3 the court determined that the meaning of the
word "father" was not limited to the natural or biological father, but
extended to the legal father, a relationship to be determined by the
court. The court further observed that a reasonable man in the position
of the defendant would be cognizant of the legal responsibilities
attendant to consenting to the A.I.D. procedure.Y The main policy
ground for the court's decision to impose criminal liability was the
state's interest in protecting the public fisc from the burden of sup-
porting the neglected child.35 Though the question of the legitimacy
of the A.I.D. child was not at issue under the statute, since it provided
for such support whether the child is legitimate or illegitimate, the
court did address itself to the problem.
In the absence of legislation prohibiting artificial insemina-
tion, the offspring of defendant's void marriage to the child's
mother was lawfully begotten and was not the product of an
illicit or adulterous relationship. 3
To consider A.I.D. to be adultery, the court continued, is absurd
[s]ince the doctor may be a woman, or the husband himself
may administer the insemination . . . to consider it an act of
adultery with the donor, who at the time... may be a thou-
sand miles away or may even be dead, is equally absurd. 37
2Id. at 281, 437 P.2d at 496, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
33 CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1970).
34This statement by the court related to whether the statute met the notice requirement of
due process under the fourteenth amendment. 63 Cal. 2d 280, 285, 437 P.2d 495, 499,
66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 11 (1968).
35 Id. at 287, 437 P.2d at 500, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
3 6 Id. at 289, 437 P.2d at 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
v Id.
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However, the court never explicitly held that such a child is legitimate,
though it did not see any valid public purpose served by stigmatizing
the child as illegitimate." While Sorensen was definitely a step in the
right direction, its statements on legitimacy and adultery were merely
dicta. Hopefully, legislatures will take the next affirmative step.39
The most recent and far reaching case in A.I.D. litigation, In re
Adoption of Anonymous,4 involved a proceeding initiated by the
petitioner to adopt his wife's child of a former marriage. The former
husband refused his consent. The petitioner contended that his consent
was not necessary because the child was conceived by A.I.D. and thus
the former husband was not the father of the child.41 In dismissing
the petition for adoption, the court relied heavily upon Sorensen,
placing emphasis specifically upon that court's finding that the defen-
dant was the lawful father of the child born of consensual A.I.D.42
Moreover, it totally rejected Gursky, stating that "a child born of
consensual A.I.D. during valid marriage is a legitimate child entitled
to the rights and privileges of a naturally conceived child of the same
marriage."
The Statutory Wasteland
Eliminating the problem of A.I.D. by making the practice a
criminal offense was at one time under serious consideration." Though
this approach has not gained meaningful support, the seemingly in-
different attitude of most state legislatures toward the need for specific
remedial statutory provisions aimed at the mechanics of the procedure
itself and the social and legal disabilities of A.I.D. children is not
a Id. For a discussion of the case see Note, People v. Sorensen: Artificial Insemination Gives
Birth to Real Legal Problems in California, 4 CALIF. W.L. REV. 177 (1968); Note,
Artificial Insemination - Upon Whom Shall the Duty to Support Rest?, 17 DE PAUL
L. REV. 575 (1968); Case Comment, Domestic Relations- Artificial Insemination of
HuMaMts, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 374 (1969)1.
3' In response to Sorensen the California legislature amended the Penal Code by adding:
The husband of a woman who bears a child as a result of artificial insemination
shall be considered the father of the child for the purposes of this section, if
he consented in writing to the artificial insemination.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1970). The Civil Code also contains a noteworthy section:
A child born to a woman as a result of conception through artificial insemination
to which her husband has consented in writing is legitimate if the birth occurs
during the marriage or within 300 days after the marriage has been dissolved.
CAL. CIrv. CODE § 216 (West Supp. 1974).
4074 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973).
41 The controlling statute requiring consent of both parents was N. Y. DOM. REL. § 111
(McKinney Supp. 1974).
42 See text accompanying note 34 supra.
43In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 105, 345 N.Y.S. 2d 430, 435-36 (Sur.
Ct. 1973).
4 4Note, Social and Legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 859,
883 n.121 citing Ohio S.B. 93 (1955); Minn. H.B. 1090 (1949); and additional sources
therein. See also Rice, A.I.D.- An Heir of Controversy, 34 NOTRE DAME LAw. 510,
528-29 (1959).
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encouraging. Furthermore, those states that have legislatively ad-
dressed the problem have done so with varying degrees of foresight
and understanding.
In most jurisdictions, the technical aspects of the A.I.D. procedure
have been left to the discretionary judgment of the medical profession.
An exception, however, is the City of New York which treats this
subject in its health code." While the code provides reasonable guide-
lines for the selection and testing of donors, along with the stipulation
that only licensed physicians may perform the procedure, there is a
semantic flaw. To provide that only a licensed physician may "perform
an artificial insemination, or collect, offer for sale, sell or give away
human seminal fluid .... 46 implies that even healthy donors cannot
be remunerated. More importantly, the statement that only physicians
may give away seminal fluid for such purposes seemingly makes it
necessary that all donors be doctors. While it appears that the intent
of this clause is solely to insure the good health of donors and in
addition prevent the commercialization of "sperm banks," another
construction is possible and assiduous attention to wording while
drafting such a provision would prevent unnecessary ambiguity. The
only treatment of A.I.D. in the New York State statutes is a recent
4 5NEw YORK, N.Y., HEALTH CODE art. 21 (1959) formerly NEW YORK, N.Y., SANITARY
CODE § 112.
§ 21.01 Physician to perform artificial insemination and collect seminal fluid.
No person other than a licensed physician shall perform an artificial
insemination or collect, offer for sale, sell or give away human seminal fluid for
the purposes of causing artificial insemination.
§ 21.03 Examination of donor and recipient.
(a) A proposed donor of seminal fluid shall have a standard serological
test for syphillis and a smear and culture for gonorrhea within one week before
his seminal fluid is taken and, immediately prior to taking his seminal fluid,
he shall be given a complete medical examination with particular attention to
his genitalia.
(b) A proposed donor and a proposed recipient of seminal fluid shall each
have a blood test to establish their respective Rh factors before artificial insem-
ination is attempted. Such test shall be made by a laboratory operated pursuant
to Article 13 and classified for hematology, including blood grouping and Rh
typing. If the proposed recipient is negative for the Rh factor, only seminal fluid
from a donor who is also negative for the Rh factor shall be used.
§ 21.05 Disqualification of donors.
A person who is affected with venereal disease, tuberculosis, brucellosis or
who has any congenital disease or defect shall not be used as a donor of seminal
fluid for artificacial insemination.
§ 21.07 Records; contents and confidentiality.
(a) A physician who performs an artificial insemination shall keep a record
of (1) the names and addresses of the physician, donor and recipient, (2)
the results of the medical examination and serological and all other tests, and
(3) the date of the artificial insemination.
(b) Records kept by a physician pursuant to this section shall not be
subject to inspection by persons other than authorized personnel of the Depart-
ment. A person who has access to these records shall not divulge any part thereof
so as to disclose the identity of the persons to whom they relate.
46 Id. § 21.01 (emphasis added).
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amendment to its domestic relations law making A.I.D. children legiti-
mate and natural children for all purposes provided that both husband
and wife have consented to the procedure. 47
The Georgia statute4 provides for an irrebuttable presumption
of legitimacy for all children born of A.I.D. during wedlock or within
the usual period of gestation.49 Only licensed physicians may perform
artificial inseminations, and a penalty of one to five years in prison
is provided upon conviction of violating this section. 5 Under the
statute, a physician may be relieved of civil liability stemming from
the results of the insemination, provided it does not arise from his
negligent performance and written consent is received from both the
husband and the wife.51 The statute permits the performance of the
procedure without the written consent of both parties, at the physi-
cian's choosing, although the child would be illegitimate under the
statute without such consent.
Oklahoma has improved upon the Georgia statute by providing for
performance of A.I.D. by licensed physicians, only with the consent
of both the husband and the wife. 2 As in the Georgia statute, though
more specifically, the Oklahoma statute provides that the child will
be "at law in all respects the same as a naturally conceived legitimate
child .... -s3 More importantly, the statute includes specific rules for
executing and filing the consent of the parties.4 Of questionable ex-
pediency, however, is the section concerning the necessity for involving
a judge in the execution and acknowledgment of the consent. This
provision places at issue the discretionary power of the judge in ap-
proving the use of the technique. If he may deny permission, under
what guidelines is the decision to be made? If such a decision is dis-
cretionary, the possibility exists that judges who are against the pro-
cedure morally or otherwise might prohibit its use in their jurisdic-
tions. The role of the judge should be limited to insuring that the
documents are in compliance with all other provisions of the section
and that they are properly filed.
4 7N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 73 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
48GA. CODE ANN. § 74-101.1 (1973).
49 Id. § 74-101.1 (a).
50 Id. § 74-101.1 (b).
51 Id. § 74-101.1 (c).
52 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 §§ 551-53 (Supp. 1973).
531d. § 552.
-Id. § 553.
No person shall perform the technique of heterologous artificial insemination
unless currently licensed to practice medicine in this state, and then only at the
request and with the written consent of the husband and wife desiring the
utilization of such technique. The said consent shall be executed and acknowledged
by both the husband and wife and the person who is to perform the technique,
(Continued on next page)
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The foremost contribution of the Kansas A.I.D. statute"5 lies in that
legislature's realization that the need for clarification of the A.I.D.
child's status is as important to those affected before passage of
legislation as to those born subsequent to it's enactment. The pertinent
section provides for the retroactive legitimacy of A.I.D. children. 6
However, poor drafting again leaves certain questions unanswered.
Since the rights and benefits of a naturally conceived child are confer-
red only if the procedure has been consented to by husband and wife,
what happens to those who, prior to the enactment of the statute, did
not execute such a consent? May they now file proper consent forms in
order to gain the benefits of this section ? In light of the intent behind
this section, it would appear that nothing would prevent subsequent
consent, but this procedure is open to challenge since the statute does
not so provide.
A Proposal
None of the previous attempts at a statutory treatment of artificial
insemination has comprehensively addressed the profusion of legal
problems that this procedure raises. Hence, the model statute which
follows is an attempt to cure the inadequacies of existing legislation.
§ 1. Definitions
(a) Artificial Insemination: For the purposes of this statute shall
mean the technique of introducing seminal fluid into a
woman's vagina, cervical canal, or uterus with the aid of
instruments, and not involving sexual intercourse.
(b) Artificial insemination shall be classified according to one
of the following techniques:
(1) Artificial Insemination Homologous (A.I.H.) employing
the seminal fluid of the recipient's husband.
(2) Artificial Insemination Heterologous (A.I.D.) employ-
ing the seminal fluid of a third-party donor.
(3) Combined or Confused Artificial Insemination (C.A.I.)
employing the seminal fluid of the recipient's husband
mixed with the seminal fluid of a third-party donor.
(Continued from preceding page)
and the judge having jurisdiction over adoption of children, and an original
thereof shall be filed under the same rules as adoption papers. The written con-
sent so filed shall not be open to the general public, and the information contained
therein may be released only to the persons executing such consent, or to person
having legitimate interest therein as evidenced by a specific court order.
5 5KANS. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to 130 (Supp. 1973).
- Id. § 23-129.
Any child or children heretofore or hereafter born as the result of heter-
ologous artificial insemination shall be considered at law in all respects the same
as a naturally conceived child of the husband and wife so requesting and consent-
ing to the use of such technique.
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§ 2. Consent
(a) The written consent shall be required of the husband and
wife requesting the artificial insemination.57
(b) A proposed donor shall sign a written form offering seminal
fluid for use in an artificial insemination5 and consenting to
its use, provided however, he is considered a healthy donor
based upon the provision of § 3. Said form shall include a
statement that it is understood that the identity of the re-
cipient of the seminal fluid is not to be disclosed to the donor:
further, that the donor shall not reveal his identity to any
actual or potential recipient of his seminal fluid. It is pro-
vided further that this form shall be filed along with all
other required forms according to the procedures provided
by § 4.
(c) The wife of any donor of seminal fluid shall sign a form
consenting to the use of her husband's seminal fluid for the
purposes of artificial insemination. Said form shall include
a statement that she has read and fully understands the
meaning of the form signed by her husband; and that she
understands and accepts that all statements made therein
shall apply equally to her. 5
§ 3. Procedures
(a) Only a person licensed to practice medicine may perform an
artificial insemination.
(b) The selection of donor semen for use in an artificial insem-
ination shall be conducted by a licensed physician.
(c) The following procedures shall be performed as a minimum
safeguard in the selection of a healthy and suitable donor.60
(1) A proposed donor of semai fluid shall have a standard
serological test for syphilis and a smear and culture for
gonorrhea within one week before his seminal fluid is
s For this and all other requirements to be effective penalties must be provided for their
violation. This author will not attempt to set out any suggested penalties. This is for each
individual legislature to decide upon. Practice Aids: See 15 AM. JUR. LEGAL FoRMS 2d
Physicians and Surgeons §§202:84, 202:85, 202:86 (1973).
58 Id. § 202:87.
s9 Id. § 202:88.
60 The intent behind this section is to provide a "minimum" standard below which artificial
insemination would no longer be a desirable procedure. Implicit in this section is that
so long as a physician complies with this and all other relevant sections of the statute,
a dvil action could not be brought against him as a result of the procedure. This would
not bar, however, an action based upon his negligent performance of the procedure.
[Vol. 24:341
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donated, and immediately prior to taking his seminal
fluid he shall be givin a complete medical examination
with particular attention to the genitalia. 1
(2) A proposed donor and a proposed recipient of seminal
fluid shall each have a blood test to establish their re-
spective RH factors before artificial insemination is at-
tempted. Such test shall be made by a duly authorized
laboratory, which is classified for hematology, including
blood grouping and RH typing. If the proposed recipient
is negative for the RH factor, only seminal fluid from
a donor who is also negative for the RH factor shall be
used.62
(3) A person who is affected with venereal disease, tuber-
culosis, brucellosis, or who has any congenital disease or
defect shall not be used as a donor of seminal fluid for
artificial insemination.6
(4) Each donor shall be allowed to make ------------ donation (s)
for purposes of artificial insemination and his seminal
fluid shall be used for only ------------ impregnation (s).64
§ 4. Records
(a) All forms and records as required under the provisions of
this statute shall be filed and recorded in the office of the city
health department in the city in which the artificial insem-
ination is to be performed. 65
(b) Said forms and records shall be kept strictly confidential and
no person shall have access to such forms and records unless
authorized by a specific court order in the appropriate
jurisdiction. 6
§ 5. Status of Parties
(a) It is provided that all children heretofore and hereafter born
as a result of artificial insemination shall be deemed legiti-
mate and natural children for all purposes, of the husband
61 NEW YORK, N.Y., HEALTH CODE art. 21 § 21.05 (a) (1959) formerly NEW YORK, N.Y.,
SANITARY CODE § 112.
62 Id. § 21.03 (b). The italicized portion is the author's substitute for a part of the section that
specifically applies to New York. A state enacting a similar section would insert appropriate
wording based on its own laws.
63 1d. § 21.05.
6The purpose of this section is to prevent the possibility of unknown incestuous situations.
Any number might be inserted from as low as one to as high as twenty or more according
to what the numerical odds are believed to be. See Note, Artificial Insemination, 30
BROOKLYN L. REV. 302, 321 (1964); Note, A Legislative Approach to Artificial Insem-
ination, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 512 n.88 (1968).
6S See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
6Id.
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and wife requesting the artificial insemination, and it is
further provided that such children shall be entitled to all
rights, benefits, and privileges consistent with such status.6 7
(b) No party (husband or wife) having consented to an artificial
insemination according to the rules set forth in this statute
may bring an action of annulment of a marriage for lack of
consummation. 68
(c) Artificial insemination shall not constitute adultery by the
recipient or the donor, and their respective spouses may
not bring an action for divorce based on such grounds, pro-
vided however, that the consent of such spouse as required
by this statute has been executed, filed, and recorded.
69
§ 5. Effect of Statute
(a) It is provided that all terms and provisions of this statute
are to supercede any existing statutory provision that conflicts
with said terms and provisions. Any such statute that is in
conflict shall have no further force or effect. The failure to
repeal or amend any such conflicting statute is not to be
construed as evidence that the statutes do or do not conflict. 70
Conclusion
The initial concern which any A.I.D. statute should address is
the status and welfare of the child born thereby. Absence of a provision
legitimizing such children results in unnecessary and unjust legal
disabilities and social stigmatization. The next item of concern should
be the creation of medical guidelines for the performance of artificial
inseminations to insure safe and healthy implementation of the pro-
cedure. Consent forms should be required of the recipient, the husband,
the donor and the donor's wife to insure that all parties concerned fully
understand their decision. The recording of such documents will pre-
vent the assertion of claims of adultery and will preclude the granting
of annulments on grounds of impotency subsequent to the birth of
an A.I.D. child. The identities of all the parties involved should be
kept confidential to insure that the child's rights are not impaired
and that no causes of action can be asserted against the other parties.
67 See notes 57 and 58 supra and accompanying text.
6See L. v. L., [19491 1 All E.R. 141 (P. 1948); Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083,
242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963). See also note 30 supra.
69 See Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
70 It would of course be preferable to strike from the books any conflicting statutes. However,
it is not always realistically possible to foresee all such situations where conflicts may
arise. Conflicts between certain statutes often do not become apparent until litigation
occurs and the statutes are applied. This section would resolve those situations in favor of
of the A.I.D. statute.
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Finally, the number of donations allowed per donor and the number
of impregnations from each donation should be limited to prevent the
possibility of accidental "in-breeding."
The foregoing proposal does not purport to be the only possible
approach to the problem. However, it can function as a starting point
for legislative debate from which a viable A.I.D. statute may be
constructed. Whatever the ultimate form of such an enactment, it is
apparent that statutory guidance must be provided.
Leonard G. Kamlet
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